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Abstract
We present a diagrammatic and step-by-step analysis of price sig-
naling quality. Because quality is a continuum on the real positive
line, out-of-equilibrium beliefs need not be speciﬁed, i.e., every posi-
tive price is a positive outcome in equilibrium. We ﬁrst study the be-
havior of the monopoly when price conveys information about quality.
We then show the eﬀect of information ﬂows on welfare, i.e., proﬁt and
consumer surplus.
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11 Introduction
We present a diagrammatic and step-by-step analysis of price signaling qual-
ity. Because quality is a continuum on the real positive line, out-of-equilibrium
beliefs need not be speciﬁed, i.e., every positive price is a positive outcome
in equilibrium. In this context, Mirman and Santugini (2011) provides con-
ditions for the existence of an equilibrium in which the price signals quality,
hereafter a signaling equilibrium. Moreover, Mirman and Santugini (2011)
shows that when the signaling equilibrium exists, the price is linear in qual-
ity. In this paper, we take advantage of the linearity property to provide a
simple analysis of price signaling quality when the unknown quality is a con-
tinuum on the real positive line.1 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the model. Section 3 provides the analysis.
2M o d e l
Consider a market for a good of quality θ ∈ R+ sold at price P ≥ 0. The
demand side is composed of informed and uninformed price-taking buyers.
Informed buyers know θ and have demand qI = θ − P, and uninformed
buyers do not know θ, but infer it from observing the price. Speciﬁcally, upon
observing P, the uninformed buyers’ beliefs about quality is represented by
the updating rule χ(P), so that their demand is qU = χ(P) − P. The price
plays the usual role of a parameter deﬁning the feasible set of purchases as
well as an informative role, due to the presence of uninformed buyers, about
quality.
Let the mass of buyers be normalized to one and λ ∈ [0,1] be the fraction
of informed buyers, then aggregate demand is
D(P,θ,χ(P)) = λ(θ − P)+( 1− λ)(χ(P) − P). (1)
1See Bagwell and Riordan (1991) for the case in which the unknown quality takes on
two values. See also Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2005, 2007, 2008a,b) and Janssen
and Roy (2010) when the good is not potentially valueless, i.e., unknown quality is never
zero.
2It is useful to refer to (1) as the signaling demand when λ ∈ [0,1) and the
full-information demand when λ =1 .
On the supply side, there is a monopolist, who knows the quality θ, with
marginal cost cθ, c ∈ [0,1). The objective of the monopolist is to choose P
to maximize proﬁts
π =( P − cθ)D(P,θ,χ(P)). (2)
When λ ∈ [0,1), the learning activity of the uninformed buyers inﬂuences
proﬁt, and, thus, constitutes an informational externality to the monopolist.
The signaling equilibrium consists of a price as a function of quality and
an updating rule as a function of price, such that proﬁts are maximized and
the price reveals θ.2 In order to obtain full revelation, the updating rule
must be informationally consistent with the price strategy of the ﬁrm, i.e.,
the updating rule is the inverse of the price function. The superscript S refers
to signaling. Formally,
Deﬁnition 2.1. The pair {P S(θ),χ S(P)} is a signaling equilibrium if, for







2. Given P S(θ),
χ
S(P
S(θ)) = θ. (4)
Note that there exists a unique equilibrium, in which the updating rule
is linear and increasing in the price. Because we consider a good that is
potentially valueless, we focus on the case in which demand is composed of
both informed and uninformed buyers.3
2Deﬁnition 2.1 focuses on a separating equilibrium. We do not analyze pooling or non-
signaling equilibrium because, unless all buyers buyers are uninformed and the ﬁrm faces
no cost, a non-signaling equilibrium in which the price is uninformative about quality does
not exist. See Appendix A.
3When all buyers are uninformed and the good is potentially valueless, i.e., λ =0a n d
θ = 0 is the lower bound on quality, there exists a unique signaling equilibrium, however,
3Assumption 2.2. λ ∈ (0,1).
Proposition 2.3 is a special case of Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 in Mirman
and Santugini (2011).
Proposition 2.3. Under Assumption 2.2, given (1) and (2), there exists a
unique signaling equilibrium in which the updating rule is linear and increas-
ing in P, i.e., χS(P)=βSP, βS ∈ (1,1/(1 − λ)).
Proof. See the proof of Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 in Mirman and Santugini
(2011).
Before proceeding with the analysis, an important caveat is in order. Note
that informed buyers’ demand is qI = θ−P and qU = χ(P)−P rather than
qI =m a x {θ − P,0} and qU =m a x {χ(P) − P,0}. Expression (1) does not
ignore the possibility of informed buyers exiting the market for prices above
θ, rather it encompasses the idea that the monopoly faces competition from a
fringe ﬁrm for high prices. This additional element is necessary for obtaining
existence of a signaling equilibrium when the quality is on the real positive
line. Indeed, Mirman and Santugini (2011) shows that there does not exist a
signaling equilibrium when qI =m a x {θ − P,0} and qU =m a x {χ(P) − P,0}
for θ ∈ R+. If informed buyers can exit the market for prices above θ,
then the monopolist (of any quality) has the incentive to sacriﬁce informed
buyers in order to deceive uninformed buyers. Mirman and Santugini (2011)
also shows that existence can be reestablished with the presence (or threat)
of a fringe competition, since the fringe ﬁrm can remove the incentive for
the monopolist to price above θ. One special case of fringe competition is
equivalent to writing qI = θ − P and qU = χ(P) − P. We retain this simple
functional form. Using a more general (residual) demand would complicate
the diagrammatic analysis without aﬀecting the substance of the analysis.4
without trading. In other words, while the price is increasing in quality (and, thus, conveys
information), the price is equal to the reservation price, which yields zero demand for any
level of quality. See Bagwell and Riordan (1991) and Mirman and Santugini (2011).
However, when the good is not potentially valueless, i.e., the lowest quality does generate
positive demand, a signaling equilibrium with trading is possible with only uninformed
buyers. See Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2005, 2008a). However, out-of-equilibrium
beliefs have to be selected.
4See Appendix B for a general exposition of the results presented in Mirman and
43A n a l y s i s
Given Proposition 2.3, without loss of generality, the analysis can be re-
stricted to the class of linear updating rules. We ﬁrst derive the signaling
demand given any linear updating rule and characterize the set of valid
candidates for the equilibrium linear updating rule. Second, we solve the
monopoly problem given a valid linear updating rule, i.e., the monopolist’s
optimal price given a valid linear updating rule is derived. Third, imposing
informational consistency on the posterior beliefs of the uninformed buyers
and the behavior of the ﬁrm, the updating rule is the inverse of the price
function.
Signaling Demand. Let χ(P)=βeP be an arbitrary linear updating
rule, where βe > 0 is the uninformed buyers’ expected parameter regard-
ing the relationship between the price and the unknown quality. Plugging
χ(P)=βeP into (1) yields
D(P,θ,χ(P)) = λθ − (1 − (1 − λ)β
e)P. (5)
Solving (5) for P yields the inverse aggregate demand
P =
λθ − q
1 − (1 − λ)βe, (6)
where q is quantity. Figure 1 depicts both signaling demand and full-information
demand represented by solid lines and dashed lines, respectively.5 As shown
in Figure 1, the informational externality due to the learning activity of the
uninformed buyers modiﬁes the demand faced by the monopolist.6 In partic-
ular, signaling demand is steeper than its full-information counterpart. This
is due to the fact that, under signaling, an increase in the price has two
(opposite) eﬀects. While a higher price decreases the quantity demanded for
both informed and uninformed buyers, it also raises the posterior mean be-
liefs of the uninformed buyers. Hence, updating beliefs dampens the decrease
Santugini (2011).
5Full-information inverse demand is P = θ − q.




















Figure 1: Full-Information and Signaling Demands
in quantity.
Figure 1 provides 4 diﬀerent types of signaling demands depending on
the value of βe > 0, i.e., the expectations of the uninformed buyers. Figure
1a shows a signaling demand inward of the full-information demand when
βe ∈ (0,1). Figure 1b depicts the case in which both demands have the same
intercept on the y-axis when βe = 1. Figure 1c draws the signaling demand
crossing the full-information demand from above when βe ∈ (1,1/(1 − λ)),
while Figure 1d presents the case of an upward-sloping signaling demand
when βe > 1/(1 − λ).
Some types of signaling demands can be immediately discarded. Indeed,
a valid candidate for the equilibrium updating rule needs to meet two re-
quirements. The ﬁrst is that the signaling demand maintain a negative rela-
tionship between quantity and price in order for a solution to the monopoly
6problem to exist. That is, βe ∈ (0,1/(1 − λ)). The second concerns the
full-revelation nature of a signaling equilibrium. If there is a signaling equi-
librium, full revelation implies that the signaling demand must cross the
full-information demand. Indeed, since χS(P S(θ)) = θ, the equilibrium price-
quantity pair must lie on both the full information and signaling demands.
Both requirements are satisﬁed only in Figure 1c, i.e., βe ∈ (1,1/(1 − λ)).
Formally,
Remark 3.1. In a signaling equilibrium, βe ∈ (1,1/(1 − λ).
Monopolist’s Optimal Price. From (5), the maximization problem of
the monopolist given a valid linear updating rule, i.e., βe ∈ (1,1/(1 − λ)), is
max
P≥0






1 − (1 − λ)βeq − cθq. (8)
Because the diagrammatic analysis is easier in the context of a quantity-
setting monopolist, we focus on (8). The analysis for the price-setting mo-
nopolist is equivalent and relegated to Appendix C.
The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to (8) is
λθ − 2q
1 − (1 − λ)βe = cθ. (9)
Solving (9) for optimal output ˆ q yields
ˆ q =
λθ − (1 − (1 − λ)βe)cθ
2
. (10)
Plugging (10) into (6) yields
ˆ P =
λ +( 1− (1 − λ)βe)c
2(1 − (1 − λ)βe)
θ. (11)





βe ∈ (1,1/(1 −λ))






Figure 2: Optimal Behavior given Valid Linear Updating Rule
order condition is satisﬁed.
Optimal behavior for valid linear updating rule is depicted in Figure 2.
Given βe ∈ (1,1/(1 − λ)), the monopolist sets the price ˆ P and sells ˆ q =
D( ˆ P,θ,βe ˆ P) units which equates the marginal revenue corresponding to the
signaling demand with the marginal cost. While Figure 2 depicts the best
response of the monopolist under a signaling environment, it does not depict
a signaling equilibrium. Indeed, since the equilibrium updating rule must
yield full revelation of the unknown quality, the equilibrium price-quantity
pair must lie on both the signaling and full-information demands. This is
not the case in Figure 2 as the pair { ˆ P,ˆ q} lies below the full-information
demand. In other words, the solution depicted in Figure 2 is not informa-
tionally consistent.





βe = βS ∈ (1,1/(1 −λ))






Figure 3: Optimal Behavior given Equilibrium Updating Rule
the signaling demand crosses the full information demand at the optimal
quantity, qS = D(P S(θ),θ,χ S(P S(θ))) = D(P S(θ),θ,θ)=θ − P S(θ), i.e.,
where the marginal revenue corresponding to the signaling demand crosses
the marginal cost. In other words, the updating rule implicit in the signaling
demand in Figure 3 is consistent with the relationship between the price and
the quality established by the monopolist.
To derive the situation in Figure 3 analytically , informational consistency
must be imposed, i.e., the updating rule χS(P)=βSP is the inverse of the
price function P S(θ). Formally, using (11)
χ
S(P)=
2(1 − (1 − λ)βe)






λ+(1−(1−λ)βe)c = βS, βe = βS. Hence, the uninformed buyers’ equi-
librium parameter of the updating rule is the solution to the second-order
polynomial
(1 − λ)cx
2 − (2 − λ + c)x +2=0 . (14)
For λ ∈ (0,1), the left-hand side of (14) is strictly convex in x and both roots
are positive. If x = 1, the left-hand side of (14) is positive. If x =1 /(1−λ),
the left-hand side of (14) is negative. Hence, the smallest root of (14) is the











2(1−λ)c ,c ∈ (0,1)
, (15)
βS ∈ (1,1/(1 − λ)).
Using (10), (11), and (15), Proposition 3.2 follows.7
Proposition 3.2. Suppose Assumption 2.2 holds. In a signaling equilibrium,









units, where βS ∈ (1,1/(1 − λ)) is deﬁned by (15).
Comparisons. Having fully characterized the equilibrium, we proceed
with a comparison between the full-information and signaling environments.
To simplify the welfare analysis, assume that the ﬁrm faces no cost. The
results hold for c ∈ (0,1), but the case of no cost yields a simple closed-form
solution. Proposition 3.3 provides equilibrium price-quantity pairs under





7Since the equilibrium pair lies on the full-information demand, qS(θ)=θ − P S(θ).
8Signaling equilibrium values for price and quantity can be recovered from (15) evalu-
ated at c = 0. Full-information equilibrium values for price and quantity can be recovered
















Figure 4: Full-Information vs. Signaling
the price-quantity pair corresponding to the monopoly problem under full-
information, i.e., λ =1 .






























Using Proposition 3.3, we compare strategies, proﬁts and consumer sur-
pluses under full-information and signaling environment.














Figure 5: Welfare Loss
demand from above, so that P S >P FI and qS <q FI.9 The diﬀerence be-
tween the two prices depends on the steepness of the signaling demand.
Speciﬁcally, from (18) and (19), the diﬀerence in the equilibrium prices is
P S −P FI = λθ/2. The more uninformed buyers, the bigger the diﬀerence in
equilibrium prices.
By increasing price, signaling yields a welfare loss as shown in Figure 5.






9To simplify the discussion, we drop the argument θ.






The diﬀerence πS −πFI is always negative. The loss in proﬁt is illustrated in
Figure 5. While the ﬁrm gains the rectangular area A, it loses the rectangular
area C.
Regarding consumer welfare, while it is beneﬁcial for buyers to infer in-
formation from the price, the eﬀect of signaling on the monopolist’s behavior













Here, both (22) and (23) are computed from the full-information demand
curve because there is full revelation. The presence of uninformed buyers
imposes a cost in terms of consumer surplus. The loss in consumer surplus
due to signaling is represented by the triangular area B in Figure 5.
13A Non-Signaling Equilibrium
In this appendix, we consider the existence and characterization of an equilib-
rium in which the price is uninformative about quality. Such an equilibrium
is hereafter referred to as a non-signaling equilibrium.
Deﬁnition A.1 presents the non-signaling equilibrium in which the price
transmits no information about quality, and, thus, the uninformed buyers
revert to prior mean beliefs μ ≥ 0 for any P. The superscript NS refers to
non-signaling.
Deﬁnition A.1. The pair {P NS(θ),χ NS(P)} is a non-signaling equilibrium







2. Given P NS(θ),
χ
NS(P
NS(θ)) = μ. (25)
Proposition A.2 states the conditions for the existence of a non-signaling
equilibrium.
Proposition A.2. Given (1) and (2), there exists a non-signaling equilib-
rium if and only if λ =0and c =0 .
Proof. Suppose that there exists a non-signaling equilibrium. Plugging χNS(P)=
μ and (1) into (24) yields
max
P≥0
(P − cθ)(λ(θ − P)+( 1− λ)(μ − P). (26)
From the ﬁrst-order condition,
P
NS(θ)=
λθ +( 1− λ)μ + cθ
2
. (27)
14If λ ∈ (0,1) or c  = 0, then (27) is increasing in θ, and, thus, informative
about quality. However, if λ =0a n dc = 0, then a non-signaling equilibrium
exists as the price is indeed uninformative about quality.
B Fringe Competition
In this appendix, we ﬁrst show that there cannot be an equilibrium when
demands are qI =m a x {θ − P,0} and qU =m a x {χ(P) − P,0}.W e t h e n
provide an interpretation for demands qI = θ − P and qU = χ(P) − P.















is the equilibrium price-quantity pair in a signaling equilibrium, where qS(θ)=
θ − P S(θ) is the equilibrium quantity.
When aggregate demand is of the form
q
D = λmax{θ − P,0} +( 1− λ)max{χ(P) − P,0}, (29)
there does not exist a signaling equilibrium. To see this, it suﬃces to show
that (28) is not an equilibrium. Indeed, the solid line in Figure 6 depicts
(29) evaluated at χS(P)=βSP.F o rP<θ , both informed and uninformed
buyers purchase the good. Although the demand of the uninformed buyers is
upward-sloping, the aggregate demand is downward-sloping for prices below
the reservation price.10 However, for P>θ , the informed buyers exit the
market and the demand curve becomes upward-sloping, due to the informed
buyers’ upward-sloping demand curve. The isoproﬁt curve in Figure 6 is
the locus of pairs {P,q} yielding equilibrium proﬁts πS(θ).11 The point
{P S,qS} is the signaling solution deﬁned by (28), which yields proﬁts πS(θ).
10Indeed, signaling establishes a positive relationship between the price and the quantity
demanded by the uninformed buyers, i.e., χS(P) − P>0 is increasing in P ≥ 0.
11Equilibrium proﬁts are πS(θ)=( P S(θ) − cθ)qS(θ). Hence, the isoproﬁt function is








Figure 6: Monopoly without Threat of Competition
Figure 6 shows that there is always an incentive for the monopoly to deviate
from {P S,qS}. Indeed, any price above P yields proﬁts greater than πS(θ)
to the deviant ﬁrm. By charging a higher price, the monopoly sacriﬁces
revenue from the informed buyers, but is able to deceive the uninformed
buyers, making higher proﬁts from them. Therefore, (28) cannot constitute
a signaling equilibrium.
To obtain a signaling equilibrium in this environment, it is necessary to
assume the existence of fringe competition. When the monopoly (i.e., the
only price-setting ﬁrm) faces (residual) demand
q
RD = λmax{θ−P,0}+(1−λ)max{χ(P)−P,0}−ϕmax{P −cFθ,0}, (30)







Figure 7: Monopoly with Threat of Competition
of size ϕ ≥ 0 facing marginal cost cFθ, cF ∈ [0,1], then there might exist a
signaling equilibrium. See Propositions 3.4 and 3.5 in Mirman and Santugini
(2011). We restate the proposition for the sake of clarity. Formally,
Proposition B.1. Given (1) and (2), there exists a signaling equilibrium
provided that ϕ ≥ ϕ where ϕ ∈ (0,λ) for λ ∈ (0,1).
The presence of a competitive fringe changes the slope of the equilibrium
residual demand. Indeed, when there is enough presence of the competitive
fringe (i.e., ϕ ≥ ϕ), the equilibrium residual demand is downward-sloping
enough so as to remove any incentive for the monopoly to deviate. In other
words, the beneﬁt of deceiving the uninformed buyers is reduced enough
to be outweighed by the cost of facing competition. Graphically, for an
equilibrium to exist, demand must never cross the isoproﬁt curve for prices
above θ. Figure 7 considers a special case for which the incentive to deviate is
17blocked.12 Indeed, when ϕ = λ and cF = 1, then the linearity of the demand
remains for all prices. The special case is equivalent to using demands qI =
θ − P and qU = χ(P) − P.
C Price-Setting Monopoly
The ﬁrst-order condition corresponding to (7) is
λθ − (1 − (1 − λ)β
eP =( P − cθ)(1 − (1 − λ)β
e). (31)
Solving (31) for ˆ P yields
ˆ P =
λ +( 1− (1 − λ)βe)c
2(1 − (1 − λ)βe)
θ, (32)
which is identical to (11). The derivation provided in the body of the paper
applies here as well.
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